



THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 









Do Innovative Workplace Practices Foster Mutual Gains?  















William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 993 
May 2010   1
PRELIMINARY DRAFT: NOT FOR PUBLIC CIRCULATION: DO NOT QUOTE OR 
REPRODUCE WITHOUT AUTHORS’ PERMISSION 
 
 
Do Innovative Workplace Practices Foster Mutual Gains? Evidence From Croatia * 
     
      b y  
         Derek  C.  Jones** 
      A n d  
             Srecko  Goic*** 
       
 
             May 14, 2010 (revision of September, 2009) 
   
Abstract 
New survey data for more than 470 employees (more than 80% of production workers) in a single 
Croatian manufacturing firm exhibits large variation in participation in innovative work practices 
(IWPs) notably online teams, offline teams, employee ownership, and incentive pay. Amongst IWPs, 
probit estimates reveal that membership in offline teams most often yields favorable outcomes for 
firms, notably enhanced provision of discretionary effort by employees and more likelihood of peer 
monitoring, as well as improved worker outcomes, including enhanced job satisfaction and higher 
employee involvement.  Other IWPs usually are associated with similar favorable outcomes for firms 
and workers. Participation in sets of IWPs, that include offline teams and financial incentives, is found 
to yield benefits to both employees and firms. Our findings provide support for the proposition that 
IWPs will produce mutual gains and also help to identify key channels through which different IWPs 
work. Women also perceive that they are less empowered and report less willingness to engage in peer 
monitoring. 
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I Introduction 
      There is abundant evidence that innovative work practices (hereafter, IWPs) of various kinds, 
such as teams, quality control circles, no-layoff policies, job rotation  and employee ownership, have 
spread rapidly in developed market economies during the last thirty years or so. Between 1983 and 
1993, Freeman, et al.(2000) report survey evidence that the number of non-monetary incentive 
programs offered by firms increased by 500% in the U.S. Similar trends appear to be at work in other 
countries including the UK (e.g. Wood et al., 2002), Japan (e.g. Kato, 2000), Denmark (e.g. Gupta and 
Eriksson, 2004) and Finland (e.g. Kalmi and Kauhanen, 2008.)   While the corresponding evidence for 
transition economies is much slimmer, the available evidence is also suggestive that such practices are 
limited though spreading.
1 Unsurprisingly both theoretical and an empirical literature have appeared to 
examine the impact of IWPs on both business performance and employee outcomes.  As different 
scholars from diverse fields in the broad area of industrial relations have applied varying approaches to 
explore several research questions, those literatures have grown rapidly. At the same time, while it is 
clear that analytical work of the kind that is becoming commonplace for advanced economies, work 
that focuses on developing and transition economies is very slim. Since it is important to determine 
whether findings for firms in advanced market economies carry over to other economies, the first 
contribution of this paper is to extend the geographical coverage of the empirical literature. This we do 
by assembling and analyzing new survey data set for a large Croatian manufacturing firm with our 
paper perhaps representing one of the first such investigations for a former communist economy.  
Another reason why case studies of firms in transition economies is perhaps of special interest 
is that some have argued that the legacies of communism will help to shape and constrain 
contemporary labor-management relations in transition economies (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman, 
1997). At the same time, Croatia was once part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(hereafter SFRY), in which a system self-management existed within a communist state. Such a legacy   3
means that examination of the potential of IWPs is perhaps of special interest. Finally, in many former 
communist countries, often privatization has been accompanied by significant employee and 
managerial share ownership in the firm at which they work. At our case in Croatia the process of 
insider privatization was facilitated by the creation of an ESOP and thus it is interesting to try to 
uncover the ways in which the ESOP and the legacies of self management and communism may help to 
shape both the design and the effects of IWPs at the case.  
However the main contribution of the paper reflects key characteristics of the case and the 
nature of our data. Whereas most studies tend to examine cases in which attention is focused on one or 
two IWPs, our case is one in which several IWPs are present, notably offline teams, online teams, 
incentive pay and employee ownership. In addition there is much variation in participation in these 
practices amongst employees and also in membership in labor unions. Moreover our survey data has 
been designed so as to enable us to investigate the impact of IWPs on both firm and worker outcomes 
and to do so for a broader range of such outcomes than has typically been the case in much work in this 
area.
2  Furthermore, while IWPs are designed to bolster firm performance, the empirical evidence on 
their actual economic effects is often quite mixed.
3 Also, for the most part, there appear to be few 
studies that have endeavored to use such data to directly test hypotheses derived from economic 
theories such as the impact of IWPs on the nature and extent of peer monitoring and, more generally, 
on what the key mechanisms are by which different IWPs are expected to produce improvements in 
bottom-line performance. 
4  Hence, in addition to providing evidence on worker outcomes, our survey 
has been designed to capture information for several other areas of interest that figure prominently in 
theoretical work, mainly by economists. These areas include the provision of discretionary effort by 
employees,  the extent of horizontal monitoring, the degree of cohesion or cooperation within the 
organization, the extent to which employees are interested in product quality, and the degree to which 
employees have knowledge of and interest in their job and its relationship to company goals. In this   4
econometric case study,
5 we use these unusual measures that are derived from data we have collected 
using face-to-face surveys to investigate the impact of IWPs, such as employee ownership and 
participation in offline teams, for employee behaviors that are expected to affect firm outcomes. 
6  
In turn we are able to investigate whether IWPs deliver benefits and, if so, whether these accrue 
to employees and/or employers and to determine whether there are mutual gains (Applebaum et al. 
2000). Furthermore, given the importance many have attached to packages of IWPs (e.g. Ben-Ner and 
Jones, 1995), our data enable us to begin to see if there are varying effects to different combinations of 
IWPs and to see if conclusions reached using data for other cases (with more restricted combinations of 
IWPs) carry over to this case in which a rich set of IWPs is present. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly review theory and 
empirical evidence. Then we overview the case study and its environment and also describe our most 
unusual data.  In the next two sections we examine the impacts of these practices on outcomes for 
workers and the firm. In the final section we summarize our findings and offer some concluding 
comments. 
 
II Conceptual Framework and Empirical Literature 
We continue by reviewing theoretical and empirical literature as it mainly concerns 
relationships between IWPs and firm outcomes. This is interwoven with a brief review of the 
corresponding literature that concentrates on the impact of IWPs on worker outcomes. In both areas we 
note that often the picture is muddled with theoretical work in particular tending to yield ambiguous 
predictions as to the impact of IWPs. Since ours is not a theoretical contribution, here we merely 
highlight some key themes and focus on those theoretical issues that are most pertinent for our case.  In 
particular we discuss ways in which theory suggests that the key IWPs at our case, namely different 
kinds of teams, employee ownership and incentive pay, might have potential impacts on important   5
aspects of individual behavior. While we concentrate on theoretical issues relating to the expected 
impact of individual IWPs such as teams, we also examine theory concerning the potential payoffs to 
combinations of IWPs. 
   So far as the literature on firm outcomes is concerned, much literature recognizes that the 
organization of the firm matters for employee behavior (and thus ultimately on firm performance) and 
thus is necessary to go inside the “black box” that is usually ignored in simple micro-economic theory. 
Broadly speaking we may distinguish mechanisms that focus on the effect of IWPs that emphasize 
financial participation, such as employee ownership, from those that stress employee involvement and 
skills, such as teams.  
Labor contracts are necessarily incomplete, providing opportunities for opportunistic behavior 
by employees and employers. Since the interests of employers and employees may not be aligned, the 
degree of effort expended by employees is a variable, rather then something that is fully specified in a 
labor contract. In turn, a literature has emerged that shows how the degree of effort may be affected by 
particular IWPs such as teams and how these relationships may be affected by other aspects of the 
firm’s institutional set up with a substantial body of theoretical work concerning “team production”, 
and also a related literature on “teams”.
7 This literature on “team production” is concerned with the 
provision of incentives in situations where team output can be observed but individual productivity is 
unobservable. Dividing the output equally between team members leads to well-known free-rider 
problems. The early literature concluded that the presence of an outside party is necessary for team 
production to function, either in performing a monitoring function (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or 
acting as a “budget breaker” (Holmström, 1982). Among subsequent works, the most relevant for our 
purposes is the literature stressing the role of horizontal monitoring.
8 It has been argued that monitoring 
functions can be performed more efficiently by employees who observe each other’s work effort on a 
continuous basis (Putterman, 1984). Similarly, it has been argued that teams can achieve first best   6
outcomes once they develop norms against shirking (Kandel and Lazear, 1992).  
  By “teams” we refer to mainly to work practices in online teams whereby employees work in 
groups rather than individually and they also have some discretion over their working methods. 
According to this definition, to some degree, teams have internalized the monitoring function and thus 
may be less subject to the free rider problem associated with team production. Incentive problems are 
not the only problems facing teams. Teamwork, both in online and in offline teams, usually involves 
regular meetings between team members that are not used in productive activities. Teams may also 
increase employee expectations about increased discretion. If these expectations are not fulfilled, it 
may create frustration and lower work morale (Heller et al. 1998).
9 
  While there are distinct costs associated with working in teams, several authors have suggested 
that in many situations the advantages outweigh the costs and many have stressed that teams are 
expected to be associated with improved supply of effort. Thus the important question to understand is 
it that employees develop norms that protect from shirking and other undesirable side effects of team 
work. Disciplining of co-workers is likely to inflict psychological costs on employees, and therefore it 
is not likely that they would engage in it without additional inducements (Freeman et al., 2004). 
Increasing employee discretion without providing incentives for effort may produce detrimental 
effects: for instance, employees within autonomous teams that have wide discretion on production 
methods and the pace of and may use this discretion to work at a more leisurely speed.   
If production technology can be characterized mainly as team production, then pay structures 
tied to individual performance cannot be used. Two relatively widely used alternatives are company 
based profit-sharing and employee share ownership schemes. Workers who receive more flexible pay 
are expected to be more committed to their firm, to work harder and smarter and to be more likely to 
engage in the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. And there exists fairly consistent evidence 
that these schemes have modest but positive performance impacts.
10 However if employees are   7
members of offline (rather than online) teams, then pay structures tied to individual performance can be 
used. 
It is also apparent that the willingness to engage in horizontal monitoring may vary between 
union and non-union environments. And the degree of cohesiveness or extent of cooperation between 
labor and management may be expected to vary between union and non-union forms (though the 
direction of this effect may vary depending on one’ view of unions—contrast Freeman’s (not so) new 
view of unions with the traditional view. 
As briefly previously discussed, many stress the need for complementary initiatives. For 
example, Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) point out that employee involvement alone may not lead to 
enhanced business performance, especially in the absence of increasing return rights. The coupling of 
return rights with teamwork may provide the right incentives to engage in peer monitoring and also to 
withhold from opportunistic use of increased discretion. Several other authors, including Ichniowski et. 
al.,(1997) and MacDuffie (1995), suggest that combinations of various IWPs may be more effective 
than individual practices,.  However this is not a universal position with, for example, Goddard arguing 
against this conclusion. Godard (2004) also stresses the role that institutional conditions, notably union 
attitudes, might play for workplace innovations to be effective. And even amongst those who argue for 
benefits flowing from combinations of IWPs, disagreements exist on matters such as what exactly 
constitutes the best set of practices. 
  Turning to the literature on worker outcomes, since there are very good recent reviews on this 
matter (e.g. Handel and Levine, 2004) our review will be quite brief. As with outcomes that are apt to 
be of main interest to employers, again there is no consistent picture in the literature as to whether 
IWPs are expected to deliver benefits to employees. One camp is often optimistic that workers (as well 
as employers) may benefit from IWPs. Thus Applebaum et al. (2000) argue that that there are 
complementarities between IWPs that provide incentives, opportunities for participation and for skill   8
formation. In such circumstances they predict that there will be mutual gains as both employees and 
employers benefit. This view is shared by Freeman et al. (2006). 
By contrast there are many who are much more pessimistic and who expect that workers may 
suffer in such high performance workplace environments. For example Goddard (2004) and Ramsay 
(2000) take this view. They expect that employees will not benefit materially from IWPs and that job 
stress will be apt to increase. In addition, as many have noted, IWPs may disappoint, and ultimately 
backfire, because of difficulties related to implementation. 
11 
  
III The Croatian Context, The Case and the Data  
  While generalizing from case studies is always potentially a risky undertaking, in the case of a 
Croatian firm, one must be especially aware of the limitations that might be imposed arising from the 
heritage of the Yugoslav system of self-management as well as the transition process itself. Equally, 
since the research was undertaken more than 15 years after the end of self-management, it is clear that 
many workers at the case would have no direct experience of the self-management model. While 
attitudes towards some IWPs (such as the ESOP) might be affected by experience of that earlier 
system, it is difficult to believe that such influences will be powerful after such a long passage of time. 
So far as the transition process itself is concerned, we note that ESOPs are not an uncommon institution 
in Croatia. In the only attempt to systematically survey the incidence of ESOPs in Croatia, Tipuric et al. 
(2004) note that ESOP and ESOP-like models existed in 9.4% of enterprises. In their discussion of 
privatization Goic, Vazarsak and Brnabic, (2006) also note the use of the ESOP model during 
privatization in Croatia. Hence, insofar as there were many other similar ESOP cases in Croatia during 
the transition period, the case firm, ADP Plastics (hereafter ADP), is far from unique in Croatia. 
Equally, it is also clear that the typical pattern of enterprise transition in Croatia did not involve an 
ESOP.
12    9
  Several kinds of data were collected from ADP. Most important are face to face data from 
surveys of workers. In addition several interviews were conducted with diverse personnel, including 
ADP managers and union representatives. Finally, additional information was drawn from other 
sources such as annual reports and other internal documents. 
The firm which is listed on the Croatian stock market is quite important in the local economy. It 
is headquartered in Split and one major plant has been located there for more than 50 years. The firm 
has multiple plants and has established a solid market niche in the broad area of manufacturing plastic 
products, with a focus on high-quality plastic parts for the automobile industry. During the 1980’s, 
when Croatia was part of the SFRY, what is now ADP was part of a larger group of companies that 
employed as many as 13,000 employees. ADP emerged as an independent company during transition 
and the disintegration of the SFRY when the original company was split into several parts. ADP is one 
of the few large industrial companies in Croatia that has managed to successfully navigate the problems 
posed by transition. An ESOP was established in 2001 as part of the privatization process; the aim was 
to transfer the bulk of ownership to employees and management, and to avoid a takeover of the firm by 
a foreign company. Currently about 53% of the firm is owned by the ESOP, and individual employees 
and managers still control a majority of votes (in fact, around 60%). with the majority of the balance 
owned by another corporate entity that is a long time strategic partner of ADP. 
ADP is part of a larger group, namely the AD Plastik Group that includes ADP and several 
smaller companies some of which are located in Slovenia, Romania and Russia. Recently overall 
employment at ADP has averaged about 1300 while employment in the group has fallen from 2073 in 
2003 to 1974 in 2005. 
More than 90% of ADP’s output is exported mainly to customers in Western Europe. The 
company is doing well and sales have tripled during the last three years and data for several plants 
show that plants have recorded sustained growth over even longer periods. Investment is at high levels   10
and is reported to average in recent years between 12 and 30% of sales. At the same time, the firm 
faces an environment that is increasingly challenging. Before 1990 most of its plants tended to face 
mainly domestic competition (within the SFRY) and had comfortable profit margins. More recently, 
managers perceive that these margins have become quite thin and that competitive pressures have 
grown, usually from overseas competitors.
13 
Many, including Appelbaum and Batt (1994) argue that globalisation and regulatory changes 
that have increased competition have compelled firms to consider means for improving productivity by 
the application of advanced IWPs such as total quality management or autonomous teams. Such 
pressures appear to have played a part in the introduction of IWPs at our case. Indeed in interviews 
with managers many mentioned that they faced growing competitive pressures in the 1990’s in their 
product markets and tougher standards for product quality from their customers, including 
requirements for IOS certification. Accordingly the firm has been required to make strategic responses 
to a fast changing situation. Such pressures to change were felt especially strongly after the 
disintegration of the SFRY. They have been sustained in more recent times as Croatia prepares its 
candidacy for entry in to the EU.  
Our interviews also indicated that the case uses a number of IWPs including offline teams, 
online teams, incentive pay as well as the ESOP.
14 During one site visit we observed online teams in 
one department with each containing from 10-12 and mainly female workers. Offline teams are 
reported to have existed for many years. It appears that team practices at ADP, especially offline teams, 
were generally well regarded by management. So far as offline team membership is concerned it 
appears that line-and top-management usually selects members. These teams serve mainly as “task 
forces” with tasks including developing new products, implementing new technologies, and general 
issues surrounding interplant and interdepartmental cooperation.   11
ADP has other practices that provide for extensive information sharing, including quarterly 
meetings and a monthly newsletter.  During quarterly meetings, the labor force learns confidential 
corporate information concerning new products, new strategies and financial statements.  In addition 
employees receive a monthly newsletter in which they are informed about developments at the firm. 
Turning to financial matters, it appears that ADP provides higher starting wages than other 
comparable firms. In addition ADP has a long history of financial participation and the system of 
incentive pay has existed for many years, while the ESOP has been in place since 2001.  
At the same time, it was apparent that the firm did not have accurate information on the extent 
to which employees participated in many of these IWPs. Similarly, while a strong union is also present 
in the firm, estimates varied as to union density at the firm.  
To provide more accurate information both on the incidence of these IWPs as well as their 
effects on employee attitudes towards and behaviors resulting from these IWPs, we administered a 
survey in face-to-face interviews with individual employees. By surveying employees at two plants, we 
were fortunate to collect more than 470 surveys, which give us an impressive response rate of more 
than 80%.
15 
 From Table 1 we see that the average worker at ADP is 39 years old and has worked at the firm 
for more than 11 years. About half of the workforce is female and about two in three are currently 
married. There is a wide spread in the highest level of educational attainment. While 12.6 % of workers 
have completed a four year degree course, almost 10% of employees did not even complete grade 
school. 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 also indicate that there is wide dispersion amongst 
the labor force in their participation in IWPs. On average between 42.8% and 67% of employees 
participated in one of the four key IWPs that we have identified. The highest rate of participation is in 
offline teams (67%) while fewer than 43% report that they are in an online team. However for those   12
who are in an online team, more than 58% of respondents report that they belong to teams that are self-
managed. About half of the respondents were union members. The last row of Table 2, part B provides 
additional information on the incidence of participation rates in combinations of IWPs within ADP. 
Again we observe much dispersion in participation rates in these practices. We see that 65 employees 
(about 14% of respondents) were in both offline teams and the ESOP; however, 137 (about 30%) were 
in neither plan. By comparison, 99 employees (about 21% of respondents) were in both online teams 
and the ESOP, while only 80 employees (about 17%) did not participate in either plan. The last two 
columns provide information on the extent to which there was participation in all four practices by 
employees at ADP. Interestingly 28 employees (about 7% of respondents) report that they were in both 
online and offline teams, as well as the ESOP, and also received incentive pay. By contrast 53 workers 
(11%) report that they were in no practice. Or, in other words, almost 90% of employees participated in 
at least one IWP. 
 
IV The Effects of IWPs on Firm and worker outcomes: Simple Hypothesis Tests 
To provide evidence on the impact of IWPs on firm and worker outcomes we begin by 
comparing a wide range of outcomes for participants and non-participants and conducting simple 
hypothesis tests. Since some of our interests are in what is a relatively new line of inquiry, the available 
literature with which to guide our research is rather limited. Hence often we employ alternative 
measures for key ideas—for example, to measure discretionary effort we use measures of both absolute 
and relative effort. We proceed in two steps. First, in Table 2A the method is to focus on only one IWP 
at a time. We compare outcomes for those who are (are not) members of: (i) offline teams; (ii) online 
teams; and (iii) the ESOP. Finally, for the subset of workers who are in an online team we examine 
whether it matters to be in a self-directed team. 
Next in Table 2B, and reflecting out interest in the effects of combinations of IWPs, we identify   13
four interesting sets of IWPs within the case.
16 For example the first combination is for those who 
participate both in an offline team and the ESOP; outcomes for that group are compared with those 
who participate in neither offline teams nor the ESOP. In the final set of such comparisons we compare 
outcomes for those who participate in all core practices --in online teams, in offline teams, in the ESOP 
and in the incentive pay scheme-- with those employees who do not participate in any of these 
practices. In all exercises findings are reported under several categories of outcomes. While many of 
these dimensions are reasonably standard in the literature, namely empowerment, communication, 
commitment, trust, job satisfaction, intrinsic rewards and job stress, others are more novel, particularly 
effort and teamwork/peer monitoring.
17 In all of these exercises we use t tests on means to determine if 
there are statistically significant differences in outcomes for employees who do/do not participate in the 
IWP or set of IWPs.   
We continue by first discussing the findings reported in Table 2A. From the first two columns 
of Table 2A it is clear that membership in an offline team by itself tends to be associated with both 
enhanced worker and firm outcomes. For most categories, statistically significant differences exist 
between members and non-members for the bulk of questions within each block. Thus both questions 
concerning empowerment indicate that offline team members believe that they are more empowered 
than those who are not in such teams. A similar picture prevails for four of the five questions 
concerning different ways of capturing communication. By using two measures of effort as well as data 
on hours worked, members in offline teams report that they work harder and longer than do their peers 
who are not in such teams. The data on offline teams in Table 2A also show that team members are 
more committed to the company than those who are not in such teams, are more trusting of the firm, 
have higher levels of job satisfaction and  they experience higher levels of intrinsic rewards.. 
Furthermore members of offline teams are much more likely than those who do not belong to offline 
teams to engage in peer monitoring—to say something to a worker who is slacking off. The only area   14
in which offline team membership is not associated with a statistically significant enhanced worker of 
firm outcome is job stress where no differences are apparent. 
Based on the data reported in the three remaining three sets of columns in Table 2A, we make 
two observations. First, in some cases we observe that it is another practice that appears to be having a 
bigger effect on an outcome then does participation in an offline team. For example, compared to 
membership in an offline team, membership in a self-directed online team is observed to have larger 
effects on several outcomes concerning communications. Second, in the main, the general pattern 
observed for offline teams carries over to the other practices for which we report evidence. However, 
the evidence is not quite as compelling. Thus membership in the ESOP does not reveal marked 
differences concerning commitment, and online team membership is not linked with many significant 
differences concerning teamwork/peer monitoring. Also while belonging to a self-directed team usually 
is associated with more teamwork and more peer monitoring, this is not found for all questions. At the 
same time in the bulk of instances the findings reported in Table 2A indicate favorable worker and firm 
outcomes for participants. Consistent with those who hypothesize that IWPs will deliver benefits to 
both workers and firms we also find that participants in all of the IWPs communicate more often than 
do non-participants with managers and supervisors outside of their work groups or teams and also 
communicate more often with workers outside of their work groups or teams.  Participants in all 
practices are also found to put more effort into their work and are more satisfied with their work. Again 
there is no evidence that stress levels differ for participants and non-participants in the other IWPs.  
  In Table 2B we turn to combinations of IWPs.  The evidence is broadly supportive of 
predictions that combinations of IWPs will be expected to be associated with better worker and firm 
outcomes (compared to situations when there is no participation at all.) In the first eight columns of this 
table we offer pairwise comparisons for outcomes for employees who are in a pair of IWPs alongside 
those who are in neither practice. Thus from the first two columns, where we contrast outcomes for   15
those who are (are not) in an offline team and an ESOP, we see that in consistent evidence that this pair 
of IWPs is associated with favorable outcomes for workers and for the firm. For most categories, 
statistically significant differences exist between members and non-members for the bulk of questions 
within each block. Workers who are in offline teams and in the ESOP report that they are more 
empowered, engage in more frequent communications, are more committed, have more job satisfaction 
and have higher intrinsic rewards. They also work harder and undertake more peer-monitoring.  
  When we consider the impact of membership in offline teams together with incentive pay, the 
results are virtually identical to those found for participation in an offline team and an ESOP. By 
comparison with findings for the ESOP-offline combination, findings for the offline-incentive pay 
combination are slightly weaker only in the area of commitment. But again in most categories, 
statistically significant differences exist between members and non-members for the bulk of questions 
within each block. Workers who are in offline teams and who also receive incentive pay, report that 
they are more empowered, engage in more frequent communications, have more job satisfaction and 
have higher intrinsic rewards. They also work harder and undertake more peer monitoring.  
Very similar patterns of effects prevail concerning outcomes for the remaining pairs of IWPs. 
When we consider the impact of membership in online teams together with either participation in the 
ESOP or receipt of incentive pay, the results are virtually identical to those found for combinations 
involving participation in an offline team, especially the pair including participation in the ESOP. 
Moreover, the findings are virtually unchanged when we contrast outcomes for those employees who 
are in all practices with those who are belong to none (findings are reported in the last two columns of 
Table 2B.)   
In sum, the evidence presented in both parts of Table 2 provides good support for the general 
proposition that IWPs are associated with better worker and employer outcomes—IWPs can deliver 
mutual gains. The analysis indicates that when workers participate in IWPs, they develop a stronger   16
sense of empowerment, achieve more intrinsic rewards from their jobs as well as higher levels of job 
satisfaction.  In turn, these empowered and more satisfied workers tend to trust management more and 
develop stronger commitment to the firm. These attitudinal changes are accompanied by behavioral 
changes. When workers participate in IWPs they tend to have more open and more frequent 
communication with management (as well as with their coworkers), exert more effort (shirk less) and 
engage in more peer monitoring (or horizontal monitoring).  Finally, IWPs are not associated with 
increased stress.  As such IWPs appear to offer a strong point of hope, even in firms that face a difficult 
environment, such as those in transition countries. 
 
V The Effects of IWPs on Firm and worker outcomes: Multivariate Analysis 
  To see if the conclusions yielded in the exercises reported in the previous section carry over 
once we introduce additional controls, we estimate a variety of ordered probit models concerning 
diverse employer and employee outcomes. In essence we estimate three sets of models for each of 
thirteen outcomes when outcomes are grouped into six sets, including discretionary effort, monitoring, 
employee involvement, job satisfaction and intrinsic rewards. In the baseline models, as well as 
controls for personal characteristics (tenure, age and gender), we include only one IWP.
18 Besides our 
four core IWPs (offline teams, online teams, ESOP and incentive pay), for the subset of workers who 
are in offline teams we also consider whether it matters to be in a self-directed team. We are also able 
to investigate the impact of union membership in a similar fashion. The remaining two sets of probits 
reflect our interest in the impact on worker and firm outcomes of combinations of IWPs. In the second 
set of exercises, we investigate the influence of several pairs of IWPs that we have previously 
examined using simpler methods. Reflecting our earlier theoretical discussion these are constructed so 
as to combine membership in one type of team alongside some mechanism for financial participation. 
In the last sets of exercise we include information on all four IWPs and then, in separate regressions,   17
we also consider the effect of union membership as well as all four IWPs. In Tables 3-15 we report the 
coefficients that emerge from these exercises. The final task is to report selected marginal effects in 
order to see if the effects that we uncover are not only statistically but also economically significant.  
Discretionary Effort 
  The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are for two alternative measures of discretionary effort—
the measure used in Table 3 is a measure of absolute effort while that in Table 4 attempts to get at 
relative effort.
 19  From the set of models reported in the first six columns of Table 3 we see that there is 
evidence that teams of both types enhance the provision of effort, and that this is also the case for 
incentive pay. By contrast, neither union membership nor participation in an ESOP is found to have a 
statistically significant effect on the supply of discretionary effort. In the models reported in columns 7-
10 we examine the impact of pairs of practices. We see that membership in an offline team enhances 
the supply of effort in both models (columns 9 and 10), though in these cases there is no additional 
impact from financial participation. In the other two regressions, in one instance online team 
membership is associated with more effort, other things equal, while in the other case only incentive 
pay (and not online team membership) has a positive impact on the supply of effort. As in the most 
restricted models, neither union membership nor participation in an ESOP is found to matter for the 
supply of effort. The final set of models includes all IWPs. Reassuringly we still find that offline team 
membership enhances the supply of effort, though now no other IWP or union membership has an 
effect.
20 In addition, and as in all other models reported in Table 3, we observe that, having controlled 
for tenure, it is older workers that report that they supply more discretionary effort. 
  Turning to Table 4 the key finding is that, as with the results for absolute effort reported in 
Table 3, membership in an offline team is consistently found to enhance effort supply. This is found in 
all specifications, both those in which that IWP is included alone (column 2) or alongside other 
measures of financial participation (columns 9 and 10) and in the fully augmented models reported in   18
the last two columns. In addition, and unlike findings reported in Table 3, in all models we find that 
membership in an ESOP will enhance the provision of effort when effort is measured in this relative 
way.
21 For this measure of effort, the fully augmented models provide evidence that some of the 
remaining IWPs, notably online team membership, also matter for effort supply, though this does not 
often show up in the more parsimonious specifications. 
22 As in Table 3, we find that older workers 
report that they work harder. In addition, the negative and significant coefficient on gender means that 




In Tables 5 and 6 we report evidence on the impact of IWPs concerning, respectively, whether 
respondents have engaged in horizontal monitoring and also their willingness to horizontally monitor. 
The results reported in Table 6 are particularly striking. There we find that membership in both online 
and offline teams is associated with a greater willingness to engage in horizontal monitoring. To some 
extent this finding is mirrored for offline teams since, in some specifications reported in Table 5, we 
observe statistically significant and positive coefficients for that IWP.
24  For the most part no other 
IWP is found to affect monitoring. Also the results for some controls reveal an interesting story. They 
indicate both that women are typically softer on monitoring (compared to men) and also that older 
workers are apt to monitor more. 
Employee Involvement 
In the following two tables (Tables 7-8) we turn to the first measure that relates to a worker 
outcome, namely empowerment (decision-making ability, reported in Table 7) or employee 
involvement (measured by my say in what happens on my job, and reported in Table 8.) In several 
respects the two measures yield similar results and findings. A clear picture emerges that all IWPs 
enhance employee participation, both alone and in combinations. This is perhaps most evident   19
concerning the impact of offline teams. For both measures of employee participation we find that in all 
specifications offline teams lead to employees perceiving that they are more empowered. This pattern 
is also essentially repeated concerning ESOPs.  Findings are also reasonably strong concerning the 
other two IWPs, the incentive system and online teams. In all specifications reported in Table 8 the 
incentive system is always found to be an IWP that enhances the average employees’ sense of 
empowerment; in Table 7 this is frequently the case as well. For online teams the evidence of positive 
effects is a little spottier.  
The evidence reported in Tables 7-8 also indicates that union membership does not play a role 
in accounting for differences in perceived levels of participation. Finally, so far as employee 
characteristics are concerned, the coefficient on gender is consistently positive in both sets of findings 
thus indicating that it is men, rather then women, who report that they have a greater say in their job, 
even after controlling for benefits for participation that flow from IWPs.  While cultural differences 
between men and women presumably play a role in accounting for this difference (and other gender 
differences in outcomes), an interesting line of inquiry would be to pursue the reasons for these 
differences more thoroughly. 
Job Satisfaction 
In Table 9 we report findings on the relationships between IWPs and job satisfaction for our 
case, ADP. For membership in offline teams, participation in the ESOP, and receiving compensation in 
part through the incentive system the evidence is very strong that each of these IWPs alone as well as 
in combinations is associated with enhanced job satisfaction. This is the finding for these three IWPs in 
all specifications. For online teams the evidence is also strong, with coefficients on that variable not 
attaining customary levels of statistical significance only in the fully augmented models that are 
reported in columns 11 and 12.
25  
While the pattern of the findings on job satisfaction thus mirrors some of the results reported for   20
other outcomes for workers and the firm, there is an important difference in the factors that account for 
differences in job satisfaction.  From Table 9 we see that membership in a labor union is also found to 
enhance job satisfaction--no similar effects of union membership were observed for other outcomes. 
There is also a novel finding concerning one of the controls, namely for tenure, for which the net 
positive coefficient implies a negative effect on job satisfaction for longer tenured workers. As with 
empowerment, men report more job satisfaction than do women, other things equal.  
Communications, Commitment and Teamwork 
In Table 10 we report findings for the impact of IWPs on communications. Again there is 
evidence that IWPs play a role in accounting for variation in this employee outcome. This is especially 
the case for both types of teams for which, except in the fully augmented models, team membership is 
always found to matter at customary levels of statistical significance. There is also some weaker 
evidence that participation in the incentive plan is associated with greater frequency of communications 
between respondents and other groups. By contrast participation in the ESOP (and union membership) 
play no role. As for controls, the positive coefficient on gender means that women report that they are 
apt to communicate less frequently than men. 
The evidence reported in Table 11 offers quite strong and additional support for those who 
hypothesize that high performance workplace practices such as teams and mechanisms for financial 
participation will deliver improved outcomes for employees. In all specifications reported in table 11 it 
is the case that membership in offline teams and participation in the ESOP is associated with 
employees reporting higher levels of commitment to the firm. The evidence is also reasonably strong 
that membership in online teams leads to improved commitment while, for incentive pay, there are also 
some indications that this too plays a role. By contrast, union membership has no effect one way or the 
other. Since the net tenure coefficient is positive our results also indicate that workers who have longer 
tenure have weaker commitment to the organization.   21
Compared to some of the findings emerging from the other tables, the evidence on the impact of 
IWPs on the likelihood of employees engaging in team-like behavior (as they assist their peers in 
various kinds of on the job training) and reported in Table 12, is relatively weak. As with many other 
outcomes it is offline team membership that is found to have the clearest and most consistent effects, 
with membership in an offline team enhancing the likelihood of employees assisting other employees 
in on the job training. While the evidence for other IWPs is patchier, nevertheless such evidence is 
present and is especially evident in the preferred specification (column 11) when, beside offline team 
membership, teamwork is also facilitated by membership in the ESOP. However, and rather 
surprisingly, we also find that online team membership tends to undermine team-like behavior.  The 
evidence also indicates that tenure and age play significant roles in accounting for differences in the 
propensity for employees to engage in team-like behaviors. Thus the net positive coefficient implies 
that workers with longer tenure are apt to engage in less team-like behavior, as are older workers. 
Intrinsic Rewards 
The findings reported in Table 13 and 14 offer evidence on the role of IWPs concerning 
intrinsic rewards. In Table 13 this is measured by how well employees regard their job as making use 
of their skills and knowledge while in Table 14 we look at the importance of what workers do at work 
relative to what they earn. For both measures of intrinsic rewards again we find that the HR practice 
that appears to enhance this outcome in the eyes of employees is membership in most specifications in 
offline teams, though other IWPs are found to be statistically significant in the fully augmented 
specifications reported in columns 11-12. However, when intrinsic rewards are measured by knowledge 
and skill (Table 13) membership in online teams arguably plays an even more consistent role than does 
offline team membership. In both cases, IWPs that provide for financial participation typically do not 
appear to have much effect, though the ESOP variable is statistically significant in the specification 
reported in column 8. So far as controls are concerned, for this outcome gender appears to be playing   22
the biggest role. 
Trust 
The last outcome we investigate is Trust for which we report findings in Table 15. Perhaps 
surprisingly in view of our earlier findings it is policies that promote financial participation that loom 
largest in the specifications reported in Table 15.  
The final task in the section is to compute and report marginal effects in order to see if the 
effects that we uncover are not only statistically but also economically significant. In order not to 
overwhelm the reader (and to keep the number of tables that we report to a manageable number) we do 
this on a selective basis. One set of illustrative exercises is to compute selective marginal effects 
concerning the willingness to horizontally monitor. When this is done we find that the magnitudes of 
the effects typically are economically significant but not that large. Thus if I am not a member of an 
offline team (rather than a member) then the probability of my strongly disagreeing with the statement 
concerning my willingness to horizontally monitor is calculated to be 1.9 percentage points higher 
(category 4), 10 percentage points higher (category 3),  6.5 percentage points lower (category 2) and 
5.4 percentage points lower (category 1). As we have already noted, the evidence reported in Table 6 
also suggests that women are less likely than men to be willing to monitor. Furthermore we find that, 
compared to a man a woman has a 5.6 percentage points lower probability of strongly agreeing with the 
statement concerning willingness to horizontally monitor (category 1), and a  2.1% higher probability 
of strongly disagreeing with the statement concerning willingness to horizontally monitor (category 4).  
In sum, the evidence presented in Tables 3-16 reinforces findings from the simpler hypothesis-
testing evidence reported in Table 2. Often there is pretty solid support for the broad hypothesis that 
IWPs are expected to be associated with better worker and employer outcomes. The analysis indicates 
that when workers participate in IWPs, they develop stronger sense of empowerment, achieve more 
intrinsic rewards from their jobs as well as higher levels of job satisfaction.  In turn, these empowered   23
and more satisfied workers tend to trust management more and they develop stronger commitment to 
the firm. These attitudinal changes are accompanied by behavioral changes. When workers participate 
in IWPs they tend to have more open and frequent communication with management (as well as with 
their coworkers). This leads them to exert more effort (to shirk less) and to engage in more peer 
monitoring (or horizontal monitoring).  Finally, IWPs are not associated with increased stress.  
While the evidence indicates that all IWPs have beneficial effects for both worker and firm 
outcomes, the most consistent findings that emerge from the multivariate analysis are for the favorable 
effects of offline teams.  In addition to offline teams, we also find that other IWPs have favorable 
outcomes. Therefore, adoption of sets of IWPs that include offline teams and other practices such as 
financial incentives, will yield benefits to both employees and firms. 
 
VII. Conclusions, Findings and Implications  
In this paper we undertake a variety of exercises including estimating various ordered probits 
models to investigate the impact of IWPs separately and in combination for a case located in Croatia. 
The most clear and compelling finding is that amongst the different IWPs it is membership in offline 
teams that most often yields favorable worker outcomes for both workers and firms. As such our 
findings are somewhat stronger than those contained in another recent study of offline teams in which 
several effects were found to be short lived (see Jones and Kato, 2007.) But in addition to offline 
teams, we also find that other IWPs usually have favorable outcomes. As such our findings are 
consistent with other econometric case studies of employee involvement including studies of online 
teams (e.g. Hamilton et al., 2003 and Jones et al., forthcoming.) We also find that participation in sets 
of IWPs that include offline teams and other practices such as financial incentives, yield benefits to 
both employees and firms. Membership in online teams (and to a lesser extent in offline teams, in an   24
ESOP and a flexible compensation system) is associated with workers who perceive that they are more 
empowered, satisfied, committed, trusting, and communicative. In turn this results is their working 
harder and their being more apt to engage in peer monitoring. These conclusions consistently emerge 
from several exercises including our estimating various ordered probits models and when we 
investigate the impact of IWPs separately and when we investigate the impact of pairs and larger 
combinations of IWPs.   
In understanding why it is that amongst the several IWPs it is membership in offline teams that 
is associated most often with favorable outcomes we conjecture that at ADP this reflects the key role 
played by managers in selecting participants. Whereas for other IWPs it is other factors, notably 
technology (e.g. in online teams) or tenure (being employed at ADP when the ESOP was introduced) 
that drives participation, for offline teams it is line- and top- management that decides who will be team 
members. Our findings strongly suggest that managers make very god use of their knowledge of their 
personnel. At the same time, in future work we would plan to examine the broader question of what 
determines which workers participate in particular practices in more depth and why, for the case of 
offline teams in particular, participation in these IWPs is not even more widespread at ADP. 
One implication of our findings is to provide support for those who argue that IWPs will 
produce mutual gains and deliver benefits to both workers and firms. In this general sense ours is not 
an original finding—while the overall body of evidence is ambiguous, some do argue that increasingly 
there is a body of evidence that suggests that, when properly introduced, IWPs may have beneficial 
effects.
26 Thus our findings might be viewed as contributing to what might be viewed as an emerging 
consensus.  But amongst that body of evidence our findings may carry more weight than findings 
derived from some other studies. They are derived from a single econometric case and thus we avoid 
the problems of firm heterogeneity that plague attempts in many studies to disentangle relationships 
between IWPs and firm or worker outcomes. Moreover, in investigating relationships between IWPs   25
and particular worker outcomes, notably absolute and relative work effort and peer monitoring, our 
approach arguably includes measures that improve over those used in most previous studies. As such 
our findings may also be viewed as helping to identify some of those channels that might be playing the 
most important roles in accounting for the ultimate improvements in business performance that many 
associate with IWPs.  
In turn sometimes our findings differ in important particulars from findings contained in other 
recent studies. We find that all four IWPs are often associated with favorable worker and firm 
outcomes. This differs, for example from Kruse et al. (2006) who report that being a member of an 
ESOP was often associated with negative outcomes. 
27 In our case, the beneficial effects of ESOPs may 
reflect the particular historical circumstances attending the introduction of the ESOP. But perhaps the 
legacy of self-management plays a role as might the co-existence of a strong labor union, as 
hypothesized by Goddard (2004.) Furthermore, we find that there are a number of interesting points 
concerning the role played by different controls. In particular, as others have found (e.g. Guptan and 
Eriksson, 2004) there are powerful effects of gender with women perceiving that they are less 
empowered and found to be less willing to engage in peer monitoring. Also different controls are found 
to play differing roles for different IWPs. In the main, these differences concerning controls do not 
appear to have figured prominently in previous work. 
It is also important to emphasize that the firm and workers that we investigate in this case tend 
to be different from those covered in most of the existing literature. Our study is one of the first to 
report findings on these diverse issues for workers in a transition economy.  It is reassuring to find that 
support for optimistic hypotheses and evidence in the received literature concerning the impact of 
IWPs, which were largely based on firms and workers with other characteristics, also carry over to our 
case. Indeed arguably our findings provide some of the clearest evidence that IWPs can deliver benefits   26
to all parties, even to firms that do not operate in the most advanced market economies and in 
economies where legacies might be expected to hinder the effectiveness of certain IWPs.    27
Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
HR variables 
Offline  team. =1 when a member of an offline team and = 0 when not in such a team. 
Online  team. =1 when a member of an online team and = 0 when not in such a team. 
Selfmanonline. =1 when a member of a self managed online team and = 0 when not in such a   
 Team. 
Union.  =1 when a member of a union and = 0 when not a member. 
Incent. =1 when receiving incentive pay and = 0 when not in such a plan. 




Age. Measured in years 
Gender 1= male; 0 = female. 
Tenure. Years worked at the case firm. 
Exper . Years in the labor market. 
 
Outcome variables 
All are defined on the various tables.  
        (a) Most are measured using a four point scale. 
         (b) Unless otherwise indicated, each respondent is given four choices: 1=Strongly disagree; 
2=Disagree;  3=Agree; and 4=Strongly Agree. For example, this is the case for both of the 
empowerment questions 
         (c) But for some questions a different 4 point scale is used. For example, discretionary effort is 
measured by responses to “How much effort do you put into your work beyond what your job 
requires?” where 1 = none and 4 = a lot.  
         (d)  Relative effort (e.g. Table 4) is measured using a 10 point scale. 
         (e) Job satisfaction and one of the trust measures use a 5 point scale. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics:   Means          (Standard deviations) 
Age      39.0  9.91 
Experience 11.8  9.61 
Tenure 11.5  9.58 
% Female  49.1  0.5 
% married  68.9   
% single  26.1   
Commuting time (mins.)  32.7  23.1 
Hours worked (mth.)  181.8  14.48 
Overtime hours (mth)  12.7  (16.9) 
Vacation days (paid)  24.4  6.34 
% less than 8 years ed.  1.7   
% completed grade school  7.8   
% vocational level  23.7   
% high school  45.9   
% Some college  8.2   
% Completed 4 year college  12.6   
In ESOP (%)  55   
Incentive Pay (%)  45.6   
In offline team (%)  67.2   
In online team (%)  42.8   
Of which in self managed teams (%)  58.1   
In trade union (%)  50   
  
 Table 2A Outcomes: Based on 


























   Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Empowerment I have a lot to say about 
what happens on my job.   1.77***  1.37  1.62***  1.38 1.52 1.44  1.86***  1.28 
"My job allows me to take part in making 
decisions that affect my work."   1.57*** 1.18  1.42***  1.19  1.4***  1.19  1.63***  1.23 
Communication  "Management is 
usually open about sharing company 
information with employees at this 
company."  
1.5***  1.18  1.28*  1.14 1.26 1.15  1.43***  1.15 
"How often do you personally 
communicate about work issues with 
managers or supervisors in your work 
group or work team?" Proportion of 
employees replying "at least weekly"  
71.21  69.23  74.60  66.31 73.23** 61.39  76.67  70.24 
"How often do you .. communicate about 
work issues with managers or supervisors 
outside of your work group or work team 
within the firm?" Proportion replying "at 
least weekly"  
57.25***  31.03  50.00***  32.04 43.6** 32.41  63.22***  29.51 
"How often do you personally 
communicate about work issues with 
workers outside of your work group or 
work team within the firm?" Proportion 
replying "at least weekly"  
57.25***  39.57  57.23***  37.52 45.75 40.13  64.77***  32.79   1
"How often do you .. communicate about 
work issues with technical experts 
outside your work group/work team, e.g  
engineers,and technicians, in the firm?" 
Proportion replying "at least weekly"  
41.22***  20.85  38.92***  17.51 29.58 26.62  45.45***  18.70 
Effort "How much effort do you put into 
your work beyond what your job 
requires?" 1=None, 4=A lot  
3.67**  3.52  3.63**  3.50 3.6* 3.48  3.69**  3.50 
Relative effort=(effort put into a typical 
hour or work - Effort put into a typical 
hour of watching TV) 0=Hardly any at 
all, 10=All your energy  
5.40**  4.23  5.44***  4.00 4.84 4.58 5.20 4.62 
Days missed in the last year   2.28  1.56  1.58  2.03  1.48  1.75  1.63  1.23 
Hours worked per week   46.95***  44.72  45.67  45.43  45.93**  44.99  46.94***  45.25 
"My effort at work affects my pay."   2.45***  2,86  2,68  2,76  2,71  2,75  2.55**  2,82 
Teamwork/Peer monitoring   "I help 
my co-workers when they need it."   2.19  2.09  2.18 2.12 2.13 2.09  2.23**  2.05 
"To what extent have other employees at 
this company taught you job skills, short 
cuts, problem solving, or other ways to 
improve your work?"             1=To a 
great extent, 4=Not at all  
2.13***  2.34  2.32 2.25 2.26 2.28 2.23 2,27 
"My effort at work is affected by the 
effort of my co-workers."   1.88***  1.56  1.76**  1.58 1.72 1.64  1.96***  1.53 
"The work of my co-workers affects my 
pay."   1.59***  1.34  2.43***  1.33 1.42 1.47  1.59**  1.31 
"If I saw a co-worker slacking off, I 
would say something to that worker."   1.99***  1.63  1.76 1.72  1.8**  1.64 1.84 1.77 
Proportion of workers who have ever 
said anything to a co-worker when they 
saw that worker slack off (%)  
25.00**  36.58  27.89*  36.84 30.33 37.34 32.96 28.70 
Commitment "I am willing to work 
harder than I have to in order to help this  2.01*** 1.7  1.94***  1.72  1.88**  1.7  1.97  1.81   2
company succeed."  
"I would take almost any job to keep 
working for this company."   1.28  1.29  1.24 1.31 1.22 1.28 1.28 1.27 
"I would turn down another job for more 
pay in order to stay with this company."   1.04**  0.88  1.01 0.91 0.97 0.88 1.04 0.91 
Trust  "I am treated fairly by the firm."   1.67**  1.49  1.69***  1.44 1.56 1.52 1.64 1.52 
"To what extent do you trust the 
management at the firm?"  1=To a great 
extent, 4=Not at all     
2.33***  2.70  2.50 2.60 2.56 2.63  2.34***  2.48 
"In general how would you describe 
relations in your workplace between 
management and employees?" 1=Very 
good, 5=Very bad  
2.78***  3.21  2.98*  3.14 3.04 3.15  2.72***  3.25 
Job Satisfaction   "All in all, how 
satisfied would you say you are with 
your job?"   1=Very good, 5=Very bad  
3.9*** 2.53  2.78***  2.52  2.69*  2.57  2.88***  2.58 
Intrinsic Rewards "My job makes good 
use of my knowledge and skills."   1.87**  1.68  1.84** 1.67 1.85** 1.65  1.94  1.77 
"What I do at work is more important to 
me than the money I earn."   1.09***  0.79  0.92 0.86 0.94 0.85  1.11***  0.81 
Job Stress "My job is stressful."   3.04  1.96  2.02 1.97 1.97 1.94 2.07 1.90 
Number of respondents  139  285  201  214  229  172  95  128 
Notes: (a) Unless otherwise indicated, 
each respondent is given four choices: 
1=Strongly agree; 2=Agree; 3=Disagree; 
and 4=Strongly Disagree.            
(b) ***Mean differences significant at 
1% level. ** Mean differences 
significant at 5% level. *Mean 
differences significant at 10% level            
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  Table 2B:  Combinations of IWPs  

















Not offline AND  
no incentive pay  
In Online 













AND  no 
incentive 
pay  
In both teams and 
ESOP and 
incentive pay  
In neither team, 
not in ESOP 
AND no 
incentive pay  
   Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean Mean Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
    Empowerment  I have a lot to say about what     
happens on my job.   2.11*** 2.77 2.14***  2.72  2.27***  2.68  2.21***  2.63  1.96***  2.79 
     "My job allows me to take part in making 
decisions that affect my work."   2.3*** 2.93  2.27***  2.85  2.43***  2.99  2.36*** 2.85  2.11***  3.02 
    Communication  "Management is usually open 
about sharing company information with employees 
at this company."  
2.34*** 2.99 2.45***  2.97  2.59***  2.92  2.59***  2.92  2.34***  3.08 
     "How often do you personally communicate 
about work issues with managers or supervisors in 
your work group or work team?" Proportion of 
employees who replied "at least weekly"  
79.69 68.33 67.86  68.72  76.60*** 58.10  67.61* 55.17  74.07  59.18 
    "How often do you personally communicate 
about work issues with managers or supervisors 
outside of your work group or work team within the 
firm?" Proportion replying "at least weekly"  
64.06*** 23.28 54.55***  24.12  55.32***  29.17  52.17***  24.30  59.25***  19.15 
     "How often do you personally communicate 
about work issues with workers outside of your 
work group or work team within the firm?" 
Proportion replying "at least weekly"  
65.63*** 30.25 55.36***  32.37  5.8.51  35.62  54.29***  33.03  55.56**  30.61 
      "How often do you .. .communicate … with 
technical experts outside of your work group or 
work team, such as engineers, technicians, within 
the firm?" Proportion replying "at least weekly"  
55.56*** 13.79 32.72**  17.24  42.55***  17.39  31.88  22.55  42.31***  12.77 
 Effort. Relative =(effort put into a typical hour or 
work - Effort put into a typical hour of watching 
TV) 0=Hardly any at all, 10=All your energy  
6.25*** 3.99 5.72***  4.09  5.51**  4.35  5.85***  4.15  5.88*  4.31 
      Days missed in the last year   3.05  2.2  2.20  1.71  1.89  2.65  1.85  2.18  2.48  3.98 
      Hours worked per week   47.17***  44,89  48.34***  44,41  46.38**  45,08  47.92***  44,84  48.46***  44,95 








                 
  Table 2 (continued)  Combinations of IWPs    

















Not offline AND  
no incentive pay  
In Online 













AND  no 
incentive 
pay  
In both teams and 
ESOP and 
incentive pay  
In neither team, 
not in ESOP 
AND no 
incentive pay  
 Teamwork and Monitoring  Mean Mean Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
       "To what extent have other employees at this 
company taught you job skills, short cuts, problem 
solving, or other ways to improve your work?" 
1=To a great extent, 4=Not at all  
2.37 2.42  2.09***  2.43  2.43  2.41  2.11** 2.34  2.44  2.52 
        "The work of my co-workers affects my pay."   2.18***  2.75  2.27***  2.68  2.40**  2.69  2.40  2.59  2.11***  2.81 
      "If I saw a co-worker slacking off, I would say 
something to that worker."   2.02*** 2.32 1.98***  2.35  2.13**  2.35  2.06***  2.34  1.89***  2.37 
    Proportion of workers who have ever said   
anything to a co-worker when they saw that worker 
slack off (%)  
17.19***  38.66  20.00**  35.56  25.51** 41.33 20.29**  34.78  14.29**  39.58 
    Commitment "I am willing to work harder than I 
have to in order to help this company succeed."   1.77***  2.38  1.93***  2.33  1.98*** 2.7 1.99***  2.37  1.77***  2.38 
   "I would take almost any job to keep working for 
this company."   2.78 2.74 2.63  2.73  2.85  2.73  2.74  2.74  2.65  2.79 
     "I would turn down another job for more pay in 
order to stay with this company."   2.91*** 3.17  2.98  3.09  2.99*  3.19  3.06  3.09  2.81***  3.31 
    Trust  "I am treated fairly by the company."   2.19*** 2.62 2.20***  2.58  2.27***  2.56  2.33**  2.59  2.19***  2.70 
    "To what extent do you trust the management at 
this company?" 1=To a great extent, 4=Not at all    2.22*** 2.75 2.21***  2.76  2.40  2.59  2.30***  2.65  2.07***  2.68 
    "In general how would you describe relations in 
your workplace between management and 
employees?" 1=Very good, 5=Very bad  
2.66*** 3.26 2.75***  3.35  2.91*  3.15  2.82***  3.25  2.54***  3.36 
    Job Satisfaction "…How satisfied …say you are 
with your job?"   1=Very good, 5=Very bad   1.97*** 2.61 2.04***  2.57  2.15***  2.56  2.04***  2.50  1.81***  2.77 
     Intrinsic Rewards "My job makes good use of 
my knowledge and skills."   2.03*** 2.39  2.16*  2.36  1.97***  2.39  2.15**  2.42  2.04*  2.40 
    "What I do at work is more important to me than 
the money I earn."   2.86*** 3.27 2.95***  3.24  3.07**  3.31  3.03  3.16  2.85***  3.38 
      Job Stress "My job is stressful."   1.85 2.02 1.91  2.07  1.98  1.99  1.81** 2.06  1.88  2.02 
     Number of respondents  65  137  58  204  99  80  72  125  28  53   5
 
   
 
Determinants of Discretionary Effort 
           Table 3 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online   0.259* 
(0.136) 








Offline     0.477*** 
(0.152) 








Selfmanonline       0.357* 
(0.192) 
                 
Incent         0.277* 
(0.147) 
     0.271* 
(0.150) 
   0.183 
(0.156) 




Union           0.117 
(0.137) 
             0.157 
(0.156) 
ESOP             0.043 
(0.134) 
   0.070 
(0.146) 






Loglike  -283.0  -285.5  -149.8  -317.0  -304.5  -321.9  -278.3  -282.9  -281.8  -285.3  -260.5  -247.2 
# obs. 
 
335  345  188  378  367  385  328  335  339  345  311  297 
Notes. 
1. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2. Discretionary effort is measured by responses to “How much effort do you put into your work beyond what your job requires?” (where 1=none…and  4 = a lot.) 
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Determinants of Relative Effort 
           Table 4 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 






























































































Online  -0.011 
(0.120) 








Offline     0.271** 
(0.127) 








Selfmanonline       0.051 
(0.165) 
                 
Incent         0.110 
(0.129) 
     0.113 
(0.136 
   0.033 
(0.134) 




Union           0.003 
(0.120) 
             0.001 
(0.133) 
ESOP            0.250** 
(0.119) 
  0.245** 
(0.128) 






Loglike  -741.3  -762.6  -403.6  -810.6  -795.1  -827.4  -722.5  -739.4  -744.0  -758.8  -684.3  -657.7 
# obs. 
 
307  315  175  338  324  344  301  307  309  315  288  272 
Notes. 
1.  ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2.  Relative effort is measured as responses to how much effort and energy you expend on a typical hour of work less effort and energy expended on an hour watching TV, where each activity is 
measured on a 10 point scale and 0 = hardly any at all and 10 = all your energy. 
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Determinants of Whether Have Engaged in Horizontal Monitoring 
           Table 5 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 






























































































Online   0.194 
(0.148) 








Offline     0.324 
(0.161) 








Selfmanonline       0.123 
(0.208) 
                 
Incent         0.266* 
(0.159) 
     0.218 
(0.173) 
   0.168 
(0.167) 




Union          -0.149 
(0.149) 
            -0.113 
(0.168) 
ESOP            0.015 
(0.144) 
  0.026 
(0.158) 






Loglike  -202.9  -208.3  -109.4  -227.7  -224.7  -236.0  -195.3  -202.9  -202.3  -208.3  -184.1  -176.2 
# obs. 
 
324  337  182  366  356  373  320  324  331  337  302  289 
                         
Notes. 
1      ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2.     Whether one has engaged in horizontal monitoring is determined by responses to “Have you ever said anything to a co-worker when you saw that worker slack off?” where 1 =yes  and  
0 = No.   
   8
 
Determinants of Willingness to Horizontally Monitor 
           Table 6 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 

































































































Online  0.341*** 
(0.126) 








Offline    0.465*** 
(0.132) 








Selfmanonline      0.074 
(0.167) 
                 
Incent        0.128 
(0.132) 
    0.088 
(0.144) 
  0.045 
(0.138) 




Union          -0.156 
(0.124) 
            -0.093 
(0.141) 
ESOP            0.123 
(0.120) 
  0.067 
(0.133) 






Loglike  -336.0  -352.1  -203.0  -390.0  -372.3  -395.4  -330.4  -335.8  -347.8  -351.8  -310.2  -294.3 
# obs. 
 
346  360  196  391  377  398  339  346  354  360  324  307 
Notes. 
1.  ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
         2.    Willingness to horizontally monitor is measured by responses to “If I saw a co-worker slacking off, I would say something to that worker” where 1 = strongly disagree …and  4 = strongly agree. 
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Determinants of Empowerment 
           Table 7 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.349*** 
(0.122) 








Offline    0.497*** 
(0.130) 








Selfmanonline      0.416*** 
(0.167) 
                 
Incent        0.308** 
(0.130) 
    0.279** 
(0.141) 
  0.249* 
(0.137) 




Union          0.183 
(0.122) 
            0.118 
(0.139) 
ESOP             0.403*** 
(0.119) 
   0.524*** 
(0.132) 






Loglike  -212.5  -381.5  -212.5  -417.3  -405.2  -424.3  -359.4  -363.2  -371.6  -375.0  -332.7  -317.4 
# obs. 
 
346  358  194  392  378  399  339  346  352  358  322  305 
Notes. 
Notes. 
1   ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2   Empowerment is measured by responses to “My job allows me to take part in making decisions that affect my work” where 1= strongly disagree…and 4 = strongly agree.    
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Determinants of Employee Involvement 
           Table 8 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.224* 
(0.121) 
















Selfmanonline      0.623*** 
(0.169) 
                 
Incent        0.391*** 
(0.129) 
    0.361*** 
(0.140) 
  0.335** 
(0.136) 




Union          0.103 
(0.121) 
            0.118 
(0.137) 
ESOP             0.251** 
(0.117) 
   0.296 
(0.129) 






Loglike  -381.0  -388.4  -214.2  -428.9  -415.8  -437.3  -371.6  -378.4  -380.1  -385.7  -345.2  -329.4 
# obs. 
 
349  363  196  397  383  404  342  349  357  363  325  308 
Notes. 
1   ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Employee involvement is measured by responses to “I have a lot to say about what happens on my job.” where 1= strongly disagree…and 4 = strongly agree. 
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Determinants of Job Satisfaction 
           Table 9 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 

































































































Online  0.255** 
(0.127) 








Offline    0.576*** 
(0.139) 








Selfmanonline      0.367** 
(0.176) 
                 
Incent        0.660*** 
(0.140) 
    0.630*** 
(0.154) 
  0.575*** 
(0.149) 




Union          0.324*** 
(0.125) 
            0.328** 
(0.148) 
ESOP             0.546*** 
(0.124) 
   0.701*** 
(0.140) 






Loglike  -334.1  -343.4  -188.6  -380.9  -376.0  -389.5  -318.7  -321.3  -330.0  -327.5  -278.8  -263.1 
# obs. 
 
345  359  193  393  379  400  338  345  353  359  321  304 
Notes. 
1   ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Job satisfaction is measure by responses to “All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job? ” where 1= very dissatisfied…and  5= very satisfied. 
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Determinants of Communications 
           Table 10 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.388*** 
(0.127) 








Offline    0.656*** 
(0.133) 








Selfmanonline      0.542*** 
(0.170) 
                 
Incent        0.326** 
(0.136) 
    0.257* 
(0.143) 
  0.154 
(0.142) 




Union          0.153 
(0.131) 
            0.177 
(0.143) 
ESOP             0.156 
(0.127) 
   0.108 
(0.135) 






Constant                         
Loglike  -449.8  -451.1  -268.2  -479.1  -453.4  -485.7  -443.4  -449.5  -446.6  -450.7  -422.7  -393.7 
# obs. 
 
315  317  188  336  320  339  312  315  315  317  298  281 
Notes. 
1   ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Communications are measured by responses to “How often do you personally communicate about work issues with managers or supervisors outside of your work group or work team within the 
firm” where 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = monthly, 4 = weekly and 5 = daily.  
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Determinants of Commitment 
           Table 11 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.321*** 
(0.123) 








Offline    0.522*** 
(0.134) 








Selfmanonline      0.174 
(0.172) 
                 
Incent        0.267** 
(0.132) 
    0.285* 
(0.144) 
  0.164 
(0.139) 




Union          -0.046 
(0.123) 
            0.004 
(0.142) 
ESOP             0.280** 
(0.120) 
   0.433*** 
(0.133) 






Loglike  -353.0  -368.4  -209.7  -403.5  -391.8  -410.8  -342.9  -347.7  -360.9  -363.7  -315.6  -299.7 
# obs. 
 
341  354  192  386  372  393  334  341  348  354  317  300 
Notes. 
1   ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Commitment is measured by responses to “I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help this company to succeed” where 1= strongly disagree…and 4 = strongly agree. 
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Determinants of Teamwork 
           Table 12 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.006 
(0.121) 








Offline    0.345*** 
(0.128) 








Selfmanonline      0.120 
(0.163) 
                 
Incent        0.257** 
(0.130) 
    0.258** 
(0.140) 
  0.172 
(0.136) 




Union          0.113 
(0.121) 
            0.175 
(0.137) 
ESOP             0.148 
(0.118) 
   0.185 
(0.129) 






Loglike  -385.6  -400.1  -226.9  -437.2  -418.3  -445.1  -377.0  -384.6  -393.7  -398.6  -354.2  -333.0 
# obs. 
 
349  361  197  393  379  400  342  349  355  361  325  308 
Notes. 
1  ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Team work t is measured by responses to “To what extent have other employees at this company taught you job skills, short cuts, problem solving, or other ways to improve your work? ” where 
1= not at all …and 4 = to a great extent. 
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Determinants of  Intrinsic Rewards (Knowledge and Skills) 
           Table 13 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.355*** 
(0.0122) 








Offline    0.314** 
(0.129) 








Selfmanonline      0.163 
(0.168) 
                 
Incent        0.114 
(0.129) 
    0.061 
(0.140) 
  0.040 
(0.136) 




Union          0.157 
(0.121) 
            0.164 
(0.137) 
ESOP             0.141 
(0.117) 
   0.226* 
(0.130) 






Loglike  -383.2  -406.9  -220.6  -445.5  -432.1  -451.5  -376.5  -381.6  -401.1  -405.9  -356.4  -340.7 
# obs. 
 
347  360  195  393  379  400  340  347  354  360  323  306 
Notes. 
1  ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Intrinsic rewards is measured by responses to “My job makes good use of my knowledge and skills” where 1= strongly disagree…and 4 = strongly agree.   16
 
Determinants of Importance of Work to Me (Relative to Money) 
           Table 14 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.143 
(0.125) 








Offline    0.424*** 
(0.133) 








Selfmanonline      0.372** 
(0.171) 
                 
Incent        0.046 
(0.133) 
    0.008 
(0.144) 
  0.018 
(0.139) 




Union          -0.010 
(0.126) 
            -0.045 
(0.142) 
ESOP             0.164 
(0.123) 
   0.213 
(0.134) 






Loglike  -337.9  -342.5  -191.6  -373.6  -358.8  -379.8  -330.8  -336.6  -335.9  -341.5  -313.1  -295.5 
# obs. 
 
348  363  196  395  381  402  341  348  357  363  325  308 
Notes. 
1  ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Intrinsic rewards t is measured by responses to “What I do at work is more important to me than the money I earn” where 1= strongly disagree…and 4 = strongly agree. 
   17
 
Determinants of Trust 
           Table 15 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
































































































Online  0.040 
(0.121) 








Offline    0.228* 
(0.129) 








Selfmanonline      0.132 
(0.166) 
                 
Incent        0.403*** 
(0.133) 
    0.366*** 
(0.142) 
  0.322** 
(0.140) 




Union          0.034 
(0.122) 
            -0.082 
(0.138) 
ESOP             0.401*** 
(0.120) 
   0.526*** 
(0.132) 






Loglike  -381.0  -388.8  -214.8  -422.3  -413.0  -427.2  -371.6  -373.0  -380.9  -381.0  -343.8  -329.5 
# obs. 
 
348  360  196  393  380  400  341  348  354  360  324  307 
Notes. 
1  ***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
2  Trust is measured by responses to “I am treated fairly by the company” where 1= strongly disagree…and 4 = strongly agree. 
 
   18ENDNOTES 
                                                           
1 For example Jones and Klinedinst, 2005  report the diffusion of such practices in Bulgaria 
 
2 Most evidence that uses country surveys, such as Kahaunen and Palmi (2008) for Finland, 
understandably has tended to concentrate on worker rather than firm outcomes. This is also true 
of most case studies that examine outcomes collected from employee surveys (e.g. Batt, 2003). 
By contrast our survey is unusual insofar as it enables us to investigate possible links between 
various work practices and employee outcomes (including commitment, employee involvement 
and job satisfaction) and outcomes of most interest to firms, such as peer monitoring and the 
supply of effort. There are other studies, including some of those produced by the shared 
capitalism project (e.g. Freeman et al., 2006) that take a similar tack though they tend not to go 
as deep within the black box as does this paper. Also there is an important and often neglected 
body of work that has used employee surveys to look at firm and worker outcomes in firms with 
very different organizational structures, notably worker owned firms. Studies include work by 
Rhodes, Long, Greenberg, Ros for US firms and Bradley and Gelb for firms elsewhere. 
 
3 Note that the bulk of evidence on economic outcomes has been derived from firm-level, cross 
industry surveys. Such studies necessarily have shortcomings such as the inability to control for 
variation in IWPs within large multi-plant firms. Equally most surveys of this evidence (e.g. 
Doucouliagos, 1995) find that normally most innovative IWPs such as profit sharing and 
employee ownership are beneficial to firm performance. However not all assessments are so 
optimisitic --see for example, Ben-Ner, Jones and Han, 1996. In part assessments differ because 
of the varying reliability of findings. In turn this reflects the different types of econometric 
methods used, as well as the nature of the underlying data.  
 
4 There is a neglected history of economists trying to measure some of these variables, including 
Stafford (1980). Ros (2001, 2003) is a notable recent exception in attempting to provide evidence 
on economic hypotheses such as effort supply by using data derived from worker surveys 
though, unfortunately, his findings are restricted in part because of small sample sizes. More 
recent work of this kind includes papers emerging from the shared capitalism project (e.g. 
Freeman et al 2004 and Kruse et al., 2004.) 
 
5 For a discussion of this approach and related concepts including insider econometrics see Bartel 
et al. (2004)  and Jones et al. (200  
 
6 As such we continue procedures that were developed in earlier work, beginning in 2000 for US 
firms. See for example Jones et al., 2003. 
 
7 Heywood and Jirjahn (2002) also make a similar distinction, though using slightly different 
terminology. 
 
8 For other related literature, see the insightful discussion in Dow (2003, ch. 8.5).  
 
9Two recent econometric case studies studies of the impact of teams are Hamilton et al. (2003) 
who look at online teams while Jones and Kato (2007) investigate the impact of offline teams. 
Both find favorable firm outcomes. 
 
10 For company level evidence, see, e.g. Wadwhani and Wall (1990); Kruse (1993); Kumbhakar   1
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Dunbar (1993); Jones and Kato (1995). See also the econometric case study evidence by 
Knez and Simester (2001). 
 
11  For example Jones and Kato (2007) document that initially there were positive productivity 
effects at the case they study but that these benefits were dissipated, arguably because of the 
failure to introduce a balance set of IWPs.  
 
12 For additional information on labour market institutions and industrial relations in Croatia see 
Greguriek (2001) and Nusinovic and Vidovic (1999). 
 
13 Some plants are located in metropolitan areas (including one on Zagreb.) While we do not 
focus on those plants in this study we note that they have faced a somewhat different situation 
from the plants we study. Two of them have aggressively entered emerging product markets such 
as wireless and broadband. Employment at these plants grew at an extraordinarily rapid clip 
between 1994 and 1999, and both had strong profit positions. However, some executives at these 
divisions expressed uncertainty about whether these new markets would be sustainable over the 
long haul – a view that unfortunately proved to be far-sighted. 
 
14 While studies of IWPs are scarce in Croatia, Poloski et al. find that IWPs are less common in 
Croatia than in other Western countries. 
 
15 The questionnaire builds on core questions that have been used in previous work with which 
one of the authors has been associated, e.g. Jones et al., 2003. Thus the survey is “customized” to 
reflect specific features of the HR set-up at a specific firm. Most questions use Likert type scales 
and solicit employee responses in worker outcome areas such as job satisfaction and trust and on 
issues that are more likely to be regarded as relating to firm outcomes such as willingness to 
engage in peer monitoring and the provision of discretionary effort.   
 
16 Of course this is not an exhaustive list of combinations or categories. We could, for example, 
make comparisons with those in intermediate categories—such as participating in only one IWP. 
 
17 While many of these dimensions are frequently examined in the literature (e.g. Capelli and 
Neumark, 2001; Batt, 2004; Freeman et al, 2000) unsurprisingly the particular language used in 
questions varies. As already noted the specific wording in out questionnaire builds on core 
questions that have been used in previous work with which one of the authors has been 
associated, e.g. Jones et al., 2003. Also the questionnaires used in those earlier studies include 
some novel adaptations of questions in some areas, including the provision of effort. 
 
18In unreported regressions we also include controls for several categories of education and 
wages (which is also measured as a categorical variable). By and large findings are not sensitive 
to these modifications. 
 
19  This variable is normalized with reference to effort spent watching TV. 
 
20 On the basis of Wald tests, the preferred specifications are those reported in columns 11 and 
12.  
 
21 Again Wald tests lead us to select the preferred specifications as those reported in columns 11 
and 12.   2
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
22 It is important to remember that for these and other results, since different numbers of 
observations are usually involved in the different specifications reported in the tables, that 
findings from different estimates are not usually directly comparable.  
 
23  Given the variable definitions, an alternative interpretation provided by a colleague who is fan 
of the NY Yankees and the NY Giants is that men may work harder than women when watching 
TV. 
 
24  In Table 5 Wald tests lead us to select the specifications reported in columns 9 and 10 as 
preferred; in Table 6 the preferred specifications are those in columns 11 and 12. 
 
25 These are the preferred specifications.  
 
26 For the U.S. studies include those by Appelbaum et al. (2000), Black and Lynch (1997), 
Freeman et al. (2000), Helper (1998), Ichniowski et al. (1997), Levine and Tyson (1990), 
MacDuffie (1995), and Neumark and Cappelli (1999). For the interesting case of Japan see Jones 
and Kato (1995) and Kato (2000).  
 
 
26 This includes previous work by one of the authors where, together with Kato, some exercises 
similar to those reported in this paper and for comparable outcomes are reported for a group of 
cases in central New York (see Jones et al, 2003.) In addition see again for Finland Kalmi and 
Kauhanen (2008) and papers emerging from the Shared Capitalism project, such as Freeman et 
al., 2003, 2004 and 2006).  
 
27 Similar findings concerning the ambiguous impact of ESOPs have been found in many other 
studies—see, for example, Logue and  Yates (2001.) 
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